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hina has become the center of virtually any discussion about 
globalization and its impact on the Canadian economy. According to a 
recent national opinion poll by the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC), 
Canadians believe that China is the second most important country/region for 
Canada’s prosperity after the United States and before the entire European 
Union (APFC, 2008). In the same poll, a resounding majority of respondents 
agrees that, ten years from now, the influence of China and India in the world 
will equal that of the United States.  
 
Yet the public remains skeptical whether China’s emergence as a major 
economic force is good for the Canadian economy. Many Canadians view the 
decline of its manufacturing sector as directly related to the rapid growth of low-
cost imports from China. According to the APFC poll, more than twice the 
respondents believe that increased trade and investment between Canada and 
China will result in Canadian job losses rather than create jobs. And 71 percent 
of Canadians believe that its industries should be protected from imports that 
come from countries with very low wages. This fear is fueled by the dramatic rise 
in Canada’s manufacturing imports from China. Between 1997 and 2007, 
Canada’s manufacturing imports from China has grown eight-fold, rising from 
US$4 billion to US$34 billion, while manufacturing imports from other countries 
has less than doubled, growing from US$158 billion to US$257 billion. As a 
result, 11.7 percent of Canada’s manufacturing imports currently come from 
China. 
 
An additional source of concern is the changing mix of Canada’s imports from 
China (Taktik Chine, 2006). If fifteen years ago China primarily exported low-
tech products such as apparel, toys and footwear, today it has become Canada’s 
primary supplier of high-technology products such as computers and 
telecommunications equipment. Indeed, in 2007, 19.6 percent of Canada’s 
imports from China were high-technology imports, compared to 12.5 percent 
C 
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from all other countries. This has created the fear that China is rapidly moving 
up the technology ladder, and becoming competitive in technology-intensive 
industries where Canada should have a strong comparative advantage. 
 
In light of these worries, an explosion of books, reports and articles have 
discussed the reasons behind China’s extraordinary export boom and the role 
that foreign firms have played therein. An often recurring story is that Western 
companies are on a large scale closing manufacturing plants in their home 
countries and are moving them to China to take advantage of its lower labor 
costs. This has created the rising resentment that Western companies in their 
search for profits are not only hollowing out their own manufacturing industry, 
but also building up China’s competitiveness as the world’s factory.   
 
So, how concerned should we be with the rise of the Chinese dragon? In this 
report, we conduct a careful review of the data used to support the argument 
that China is a rising threat to the Canadian economy. While the evidence of 
China’s rising threat at first sight seems resounding, we demonstrate that the 
reality is less clear-cut once a deeper analysis of the data is conducted. Our study 
allows us to debunk three “myths” about China’s role in the world economy: 
 
MYTH 1. More than a tenth of Canada’s manufacturing imports are made in 
China. 
 
MYTH 2. China’s comparative advantage is rapidly shifting from low-technology 
to high-technology products. 
 
MYTH 3. Canadian firms are on a large scale moving their manufacturing plants 
to China to take advantage of its cheap labor, thus effectively hollowing out 
Canada’s manufacturing sector and building up China as the world’s factory. 
In the next section, we will discuss each “myth” in three parts. First, we will 
provide the supporting evidence that is generally used to buttress the “myth”. 
Second, we will provide counter evidence. Third, we will provide a verdict that 
more accurately portrays China’s role in the global economy.   
How concerned 
should we be 
with the rise of 
the Chinese 
dragon? 
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A Tale of Three Myths 
 
“More than a tenth of Canada’s manufacturing 
imports are made in China.” 
 
Supporting Evidence 
 
n the past decade, Canada's imports from China have grown at an 
exceptional rate. Between 1997 and 2007, Chinese manufacturing imports 
have grown at an annualized rate of 22.9 percent, almost four times faster than 
the growth rate of Canada’s total manufacturing imports (see table 1). As a 
result, China’s share of Canadian imports has risen from 2.7 percent in 1997 to 
11.7 percent in 2007, thus surpassing Japan and Mexico to become Canada’s 
second largest import partner behind the United States.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
 Canada’s Ten Largest Manufacturing Import Partners in 2007 
Country Imports (US$ million) Import share (%) 
Growth rate 
 1997-2007 (%) 
 1997 2007 1997 2007  
United States 114,937 166,657 70.6 57.2 3.8 
China 4,352 34,239 2.7 11.7 22.9 
Japan 8,924 14,180 5.5 4.9 4.7 
Mexico 4,570 13,995 2.8 4.8 11.8 
Germany 3,667 10,166 2.3 3.5 10.7 
United Kingdom 3,027 5,690 1.9 2.0 6.5 
South Korea 1,993 4,817 1.2 1.7 9.2 
France 3,283 3,930 2.0 1.3 1.8 
Italy 1,919 3,857 1.2 1.3 7.2 
Taiwan 2,445 3,543 1.5 1.2 3.8 
WORLD 162,792 291,474 100.0 100.0 6.0 
Source: WITS. 
I 
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Many observers have taken the fact that 11.7 percent of Canada’s manufacturing 
imports come from China as evidence that the same share of imports are made 
in China, thus leading to Myth 1. 
 
Counter Evidence 
The problem with this “evidence” lies in the way that exports are measured. 
Statistical agencies collect and report export data as the gross value of the goods 
that leave a country’s borders rather than as the value that was produced in that 
country. If a country relies on imported inputs to produce its export goods, this 
implies that there is a discrepancy between the value exported by a country and 
the value made in a country. To illustrate this, consider figure 1 in which the 
country Home produces an export good z through the assembly of inputs x and 
y. The figure depicts two scenarios. In scenario 1, the production of the inputs x 
and y and the final assembly of product z all occur at Home. As a result, the 
value exported by Home x+y+z equals the value made in Home. In scenario 2, 
the inputs x and y are imported from abroad, while only the final assembly 
occurs at Home. In this case, the value exported by Home x+y+z not only 
contains the value made in Home z, but also the value of the imported inputs 
x+y. The figure implies that for countries that heavily rely on imported inputs to 
produce their export goods, the export value can significantly exceed the value 
made in the country.  
 
Figure 1 
“Exported by China” versus “Made in China” 
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China is a textbook example of a country that heavily relies on foreign inputs to 
produce its exports (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006; Gangnes and Van Assche, 
2008; Van Assche and Gangnes, 2008). Since the early 1990s, many multinational 
firms have moved their labor-intensive assembly plants to China in a bid to 
reduce production costs. These firms ship their inputs to China, where they are 
assembled and then re-exported to the final destination market. Data provided 
by China’s Customs Statistics show the importance of such assembly plants on 
China’s export performance. According to China’s customs rules, firms are 
allowed to import inputs without paying custom duties provided that these 
inputs are used to produce final goods destined solely for exports. The trade 
associated with this export platform program is referred to as processing trade. In 
Figure 2, we illustrate the large and growing role of processing trade in China’s 
exports. Between 1988 and 2005, its share in China's total exports has risen from 
30 percent to 55 percent. In other words, currently more than half of China’s 
exports are conducted by processing plants that merely assemble imported 
inputs for export purposes. 
Figure 2 
Processing Export Share in China’s Total Export (1988-2005) 
25
35
45
55
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88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Share processing exports Share ordinary exports
 
Source: Van Assche et al. (2008), using China’s Customs Statistics data. 
China is a 
textbook example 
of a country that 
heavily relies on 
foreign inputs to 
produce its 
exports. 
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Since these processing plants heavily rely on imported inputs to produce their 
export goods, the discrepancy between the value exported by China and the 
value made in China is particularly large. We can use both anecdotal and 
statistical evidence to demonstrate this. First, consider the example of the iPod, 
which China assembles for Apple and exports to the rest of the world. Linden et 
al. (2007) show that the Chinese export value for a unit of a 30GB video model 
in 2006 was about $150. However, they estimate that only $4 of this value is 
attributable to producers located in China, with the large brunt of value added 
being created in the United States, Japan and Korea. This example suggests that 
only 2.6 percent of China’s export value of iPods is really made in China.   
 
A recent study by Koopman et al. (2008) provides aggregate statistical evidence 
that (i) a significant share of China’s export value corresponds to the value of the 
imported inputs embodied in the exports and (ii) that this share is larger for 
processing trade than for non-processing trade. For processing trade, the authors 
estimate that only 17.7 percent of its export value in 2006 was made in China, 
while 82.3 percent corresponded to the value of the imported inputs.  For non-
processing trade, on the other hand, 88.3 percent of the export value was made 
in China, with imported inputs only accounting for 11.7 percent of the value. 
Overall, the authors estimate that only 49.4 percent of China’s export value is 
truly made in China.  
 
Table 2 
Share of export value that is made in China 
 
1997 2006 
Total exports 47.6 49.4 
Non­processing exports 94.3 88.3 
Processing exports 17.7 17.7 
Source: Koopman et al. (2008). 
Only 2.6 percent 
of China’s export 
value of iPods is 
really made in 
China. 
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We can use Koopman et al.’s (2008) estimates to make a more accurate 
assessment of the share of Canadian manufacturing imports that is truly made in 
China: if we take into account that only 49.4 percent of China’s export value is 
created in China, then this means that correspondingly only 5.8 of Canada’s 
imports from China is made in the country. Table 1 shows that this share is only 
slightly larger than that of Canada’s manufacturing imports from Japan. 
Furthermore, if we take into account that Japan is the second largest source of 
the inputs processed in China, then it is likely that a larger share of Canada’s 
import value continues to be made in Japan rather than in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VERDICT 
While  it  is  true  that  11.7  percent  of  Canada’s  manufacturing  imports 
come from China, only half of that value is made in China. 
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“China’s comparative advantage is 
rapidly shifting from low-technology  
to high-technology products.” 
 
 
Supporting Evidence 
 
nother public concern is that China’s export mix seems to be upgrading 
rapidly. Where 15 years ago, China primarily exported low-technology 
products such as apparel, toys and footwear to Canada, today it has become a 
key supplier of high-technology products such as electronic and 
telecommunications equipment. This has caused the fear that China is rapidly 
moving up the technology ladder and becoming competitive in technology-
intensive areas where a developed country such as Canada should have a 
comparative advantage.  
 
Evidence of China’s shift into high-technology exports is seemingly abundant. In 
Table 3, we list Canada’s ten largest import categories from China. As is 
expected from a developing country, most categories are labor-intensive 
products such as baby carriages/toys/games/sporting goods, articles of apparel, 
footwear and women’s clothing. However, counter to the prediction of standard 
trade theory, four of the ten categories (including the largest) are high-
technology products. Currently, Canada imports 56.6 of its Sound/TV recorders, 
43 percent of its computer equipment, 29 percent of its household electrical 
equipment and 25 percent of its telecom equipment from China. This gives a 
first indication that China is specializing in the export of high-technology goods. 
 
A 
China has become  
a key supplier of 
high-technology 
products such as 
electronic and 
telecommuni-
cations 
equipment. 
MYTH 2 
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Table 3 
Canada’s Ten Largest Import Categories from China, 2007 
Product Category 
Import Value 
(US$ million) 
China’s share in 
Canadian imports (%)
Computer equipment 3,747 43.3 
Baby carriages/toys/games/sporting goods 2,883 64.1 
Telecommunications equipment n.e.s. 2,037 25.4 
Furniture and parts thereof 1,794 30.2 
Articles of apparel 1,344 53.0 
Sound/TV recorders 1,147 56.6 
Footwear 1,136 66.0 
Women/girls clothing, woven 1,031 61.6 
Household electrical equipment 813 29.4 
Articles, n.e.s. of plastics 800 20.1 
Source: WITS 
 
Even more compelling “evidence” of this rapid upgrading pattern can be 
obtained by disaggregating China’s exports according to the degree of their 
technological intensity.1 As Table 4 illustrates, China’s export growth between 
1992 and 2005 has primarily been in the two highest technology categories: 
medium-high-technology exports grew 22 percent per year, while high-
technology exports grew an even more impressive 32 percent per year.2 The 
combined share of these two categories has grown from 23.5 percent in 1992 to 
a staggering 53.7 percent in 2005. Currently, more than half of China’s exports 
are high-tech! 
                                                 
1 In this part, we rely on the OECD’s classification of manufacturing sectors into four 
technological categories: high-technology industries, medium-high-technology industries, 
medium-low-technology industries and low-technology industries (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).  
2 High-technology industries include aerospace, pharmaceuticals, office and computing 
machinery, radio, TV and communication equipment and medical, precision and optical 
instruments. 
Currently, more 
than half of 
China’s exports 
are high-tech! 
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Table 4 
China’s Exports by Technological Level 
 Exports 
(US$ mil.) 
Export share (%) Growth rate (%) 
RCA 
index 
 1992 2005 1992 2005 1992-2005 1992 2005 
High-Tech 5,972 230,889 7.0 30.3 32 0.53 1.64 
Med-high Tech 14,053 178,568 16.5 23.4 22 0.42 0.67 
Med-low Tech 16,455 144,807 19.4 19.0 18 1.17 1.07 
Low-Tech 36,902 178,909 43.4 23.5 13 2.05 1.56 
Non-manufacturing 11,558 28,827 13.6 3.8 7 1.38 0.44 
Total 84,940 761,999 100 100 18 1.00 1.00 
Source: Van Assche et al. (2008), using WITS data. 
 
To measure if this rise in high-technology exports is more pronounced in China 
than in other countries, economists use revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
indices.3 A RCA value that exceeds unity for a specific product category implies 
that the country is more specialized in the export of that product than the rest of 
the world. Table 4 shows that China in 1992 still had a specialization pattern that 
was consistent with its status as a developing country. Specifically, it had a 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) in the two lower technology 
categories, while it has a revealed comparative disadvantage (RCA<1) in the two 
higher technology categories. In 2005, however, its specialization pattern has 
changed dramatically. China not only had a revealed comparative advantage in 
low-technology and medium-low-technology products, but had also garnered a 
strong comparative advantage in high-technology products. These trends have 
led some well-renowned economists to suggest that China’s export mix is 
upgrading more rapidly than one would expect from a developing country. 
Rodrik (2006), for example, stated that “China has somehow managed to latch 
                                                 
3 The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index is generally calculated as an industry i’s share 
of  country c’s exports divided by its share of world exports (Balassa, 1965) . 
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on to advanced, high productivity products that one would not normally expect 
a poor, labor abundant country like China to produce, let alone export.” Schott 
(2008) exclaims that “China's export bundle increasingly overlaps with that of 
more developed countries, rendering it more sophisticated than countries with 
similar endowments.” 
 
Counter Evidence 
The problem with these statistics is that the discrepancy between what is 
“Exported by China” and what is “Made in China” may be larger for high-
technology industries than low-technology industries. If China relies more on 
imported inputs in its high-technology exports than in its low-technology 
exports, then this might create the statistical mirage that China is rapidly moving 
up the technology ladder.  
 
To demonstrate that the data evidence is indeed a statistical mirage, we in Figure 
3 depict the share of processing exports (exports made of imported inputs) in 
China’s total exports for each technology category. Tellingly, the share is smaller 
for the lower technology industries than for the higher technology industries. In 
2005, processing trade consisted of 30 percent of low-technology exports; 40 
percent of medium-low-technology exports; 50 percent of medium-high-
technology exports; and 90 percent of high-technology exports.  Since the share 
of the export value made in China is smaller for processing trade than non-
processing trade (see Table 2), this suggests that the discrepancy between 
“Exported by China” and “Made in China” is largest for the high-technology 
categories. In simple terms, the more high-tech are the exports, the more heavily 
China relies on imported (high-tech) inputs. 
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Figure 3 
Processing Share in Total Exports by Technological Level (1992-2005) 
 
Source: Van Assche et al. (2008), using China’s Customs Statistics Data. 
 
An additional source of statistical bias is that the share of the value made in 
China is generally smaller in the high-technology industries than in the low-
technology industries. Koopman et al. (2008) estimate the share of domestic 
value added in processing exports by industry. Table 5 shows this share for 
Canada’s ten largest import categories from China. For the high-technology 
industries electronic computer and telecommunications equipment, less than 10 
percent of processing exports value is made in China, while for the lower 
technology categories furniture, toys/sporting/athletic/recreation products and 
wearing apparel, a share of more than 30 percent is made in China. 
 
For the high-technology industries electronic 
computer and telecommunications 
equipment, less than 10% of processing 
exports value is made in China.
 15 
 
Table 5 
Canada’s Ten Largest Import Categories from China, 2002 
Industries 
Processing exports in 
percent of industry 
exports 
Domestic value added 
in processing exports 
(%) 
Electronic computer 99.1 3.9 
Telecommunications equipment 91.2 8.4 
Radio, TV and comm. Equipment 90.6 31.2 
Household electric appliances 79.1 23.7 
Toys/sporting/athletic/recreation products 72.9 39.7 
Plastic products 64.5 12.5 
Furniture 47.2 62.3 
Wearing apparel 45.1 37.6 
Textiles productions 24.0 30.0 
Source: Koopman et al. (2008). 
 
A more accurate measure of China’s upgrading trajectory can be obtained by 
focusing on China’s mix of non-processing exports, for which almost 90 percent 
of the export value is produced in China (see Table 2). In Table 6, we have 
disaggregated China’s non-processing exports according to their technological 
intensity. The data in the table suggest that China’s specialization pattern is in 
line with the predictions of standard trade theory. In both 1992 and 2005, China 
had a revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) in the two lowest technology 
categories and a revealed comparative disadvantage (RCA<1) in the two highest 
technology categories. These numbers run counter to the suggestion that China’s 
comparative advantage is rapidly shifting from low-technology to high-
technology products. 4 
                                                 
4 See Amiti and Freund (2008), Gangnes and Van Assche (2008) and Van Assche and Gangnes 
(2008) for further evidence. 
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Table 6 
China’s Ordinary Exports by Technological Level 
 
Non-processing 
exports (US$ mil.) 
Share of non-
processing 
exports (%) 
Growth rate (%) 
RCA 
index 
 1992 2005 1992 2005 1992-2005 1992 2005 
High-Tech 684 23,057 1.5 6.7 31 0.10 0.36 
Med-high Tech 7,626 87,773 16.8 25.4 21 0.48 0.75 
Med-low Tech 6,147 87,958 13.6 25.5 23 0.78 1.41 
Low-Tech 19,773 123,704 43.6 35.8 15 2.46 2.78 
Non-manufacturing 11,102 23,025 24.5 8.3 8 1.62 0.50 
Total 45,333 345,518 100 100 17 1.00 1.00 
Source: Van Assche et al. (2008), using China’s Customs Statistics Data. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VERDICT 
Even  though  China’s  exports  have  primarily  grown  in  high‐technology 
industries, the production activities taking place  in China have remained 
low‐tech. 
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 “Canadian firms are on a large scale moving 
their manufacturing plants to China to take 
advantage of its cheap labor, thus effectively 
hollowing out Canada’s manufacturing sector.” 
 
Supporting Evidence 
 
here is a large and mounting apprehension among the Canadian public 
that its manufacturing firms have played a key role in both the build-up 
of China’s export sector and in the demise of Canada’s manufacturing industry. 
The argument goes as follows. Canadian firms that originally manufactured their 
products locally are now closing their plants and moving them to China to take 
advantage of its cheaper labor. This effectively is helping China to build up a 
highly competitive export industry and is also threatening our own 
manufacturing industry. 
 
Two statistics seem to buttress this idea. First, 47.2 percent of China’s exports to 
Canada are processing exports, thus suggesting that almost half of China’s 
exports to Canada is conducted by firms who take advantage of the low cost of 
assembling components in China. Second, China’s processing exports are almost 
entirely conducted by foreign-invested enterprises rather than Chinese 
companies. When taken together, both statistics seem to suggest that Canadian 
and other Western companies’ decision to offshore their manufacturing plants to 
China is driving the rise of processing exports from China to Canada, thus 
hollowing out the Western manufacturing industries and building up China’s 
export sector. 
 
T 
MYTH 3 
 18 
 
Counter Evidence 
The problem with this evidence is that it assumes that the foreign-invested 
enterprises responsible for China’s processing exports to Canada are Canadian or 
Western companies. Statistical evidence shows that this is not the case. Each 
year, China’s Ministry of Commerce compiles a list of China’s 200 largest 
exporting firms. Branstetter and Foley (2008) have analyzed this list and have 
shown that the majority of the exporting firms are indeed foreign invested 
enterprises, but that they primarily are from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South 
Korea. Western firms play a relatively small role, with the total share of the U.S., 
European, and Japanese multinationals in the exports of these top 200 firms 
amounting to only 11 percent.  
 
Furthermore, it is not the case that these Asian firms heavily rely on processing 
inputs from the West. As is shown in Table 7, almost 80 percent of China’s 
processing imports originate from China’s East Asian neighbors, while only 7.1 
percent of processing imports originate from the United States, Canada and the 
EU-25.  
 
Table 7 
Source and destination market of China’s processing trade 
 Share of processing exports 
destined to: 
Share of processing imports 
originating from: 
NIEs 31.1 62.9 
Japan 12.0 10.4 
ASEAN-4   3.2   5.5 
United States 25.5   3.5 
EU-25 19.3   3.3 
Canada   1.3   0.3 
Source: Chang et al. (2008), using China’s Customs Statistics data. 
 
The majority of 
the Chinese 
exporting firms 
are indeed 
foreign invested 
enterprises, but 
that they 
primarily are 
from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and 
South Korea. 
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So what is the reason why Western firms move their operations to China? In a 
recent paper, Branstetter and Foley (2008) demonstrate that Western firms 
mainly set up their operations in China to gain access to its large and growing 
consumer market. They use data on sales of U.S. affiliate in China to provide 
evidence of this. In 2004, 72.6 percent ($39.7 billion) of U.S. affiliate sales were 
directed to the Chinese market rather than exported. And only 6.8 percent ($3.7 
billion) of these sales were exported to the U.S. market. Compared to China’s 
total exports to the U.S., this is a very small number.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VERDICT 
Western firms that move their production plants to China generally do so 
as  a  part  of  their  strategy  to  improve  their  access  to  the  large  and 
growing  Chinese  consumer  market,  and  not  to  merely  reduce  their 
production costs. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
 
n this report, we have debunked three popular misconceptions related to 
China’s role in the global economy. Specifically, we have demonstrated 
that: 
• While it is true that 11.7 percent of Canada’s manufacturing imports come 
from China, only half of that value is made in China.   
 
• Even though China’s exports have primarily grown in high-technology 
industries, the production activities taking place in China have remained low-
tech.  
 
• Western firms that move their production plants to China generally do so as 
a part of their strategy to improve their access to the large and growing 
Chinese consumer market, and not to merely reduce their production costs. 
These facts provide us with a different picture of China’s role in the global 
economy than is generally portrayed by the popular press. China is not the rising 
dragon that is single-handedly challenging Western manufacturing firms in both 
low-technology and high-technology industries. Nor is China the Mecca of 
cheap labor that is on a large scale used by Western firms to reduce their 
production costs. Rather, China is used as a labor-intensive final assembly 
platform for primarily Asian firms that use it to export their final goods to the 
West. The Western firms that move their operations to China primarily do so to 
gain access to the large and growing Chinese consumer market.  
 
I 
CONCLUSION 
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